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Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., joined the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in 1957. After being the court's chief judge for
many years, he took senior status in 1981. He continued to serve on that
court until his death in November 1989.
Most people know Judge Haynsworth as someone who was nomi-
nated to the Supreme Court in 1969 by President Richard Nixon and
who was one of the few Supreme Court nominees in the 20th century to
be rejected by the Senate. The Senate's rejection of Judge Haynsworth,
followed immediately by its rejection of Judge Carswell's nomination, fo-
cused attention on the relative roles of President and Senate in the judi-
cial selection process in a way they had not been focused on previously
and were not to be focused on again until the Senate's 1987 rejection of
the nomination of Judge Robert Bork.'
After the rejection of his Supreme Court nomination, Judge Hayn-
sworth remained on the Fourth Circuit. This continued service distin-
guished him from subsequent nominees G. Harrold Carswell and later
Robert Bork, who both left the bench soon after their nominations were
rejected. Judge Haynsworth's own correspondence, which we are
pleased to be able to make available, provides some insight into his deci-
sion to remain on the Fourth Circuit and on an aspect of the controversy
surrounding his nomination to the high court. In this brief Article, we
touch on two matters related to Judge Haynsworth's nomination to the
Supreme Court and to his subsequent work. One concerns a point of
historical interest; the other concerns the relative roles of ideology, parti-
sanship, and ethical considerations in the confirmation process. Corre-
spondence from Judge Haynsworth, not previously publicly available, is
central to our treatment of both matters and the raison d'etre for this
Article.
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1. See Beiser, The Haynsworth Affair Reconsidered: The Significance of Conflicting Percep.
tions of the Judicial Role, 23 VAND. L. REv. 263 (1970).
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I.
We turn first to history. The last rejectibn of a Supreme Court nom-
ination, prior to Judge Haynsworth's nomination, had been the rejection
of Judge John Parker in 1930, also a judge of the Fourth Circuit and later
its chief judge.2 Judge Parker's defeat largely resulted from reaction to
an earlier statement he had made, while a candidate for public office, that
Negroes should not be allowed to vote and to his ruling that "yellow-
dog" contracts (prohibiting the signer from joining a union) were valid. 3
Labor organizations and the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP) joined in leading the opposition to Judge
Parker.
Although the specific issues that sparked the opposition of labor and
the NAACP differed, the coalition opposing Judge Haynsworth's nomi-
nation was the same. Thus the rejections of these two distinguished
judges from the South provided many parallels.4 As we shall explain,
there also was a personal connection between Judge Haynsworth and
Judge Parker. Although Judge Haynsworth realized that history, in the
form of two consecutive rejections of Supreme Court nominations, had
caused people to think of his name along with that of Judge Carswell, he
was unhappy about being grouped with that judge. As he put it in a
letter to us a few years after the nomination:
I can never avoid some disparagement from the inclination that every-
one has to treat Judge Carswell and me together. Your statement, for
instance, that the law professors were opposed to both of us, with some
documentation as to him, is true as far as I know as to him. Some
professors expressed opposition to me, but many, many others were
my staunch supporters. They came from all over the country and they
included every professor of law who knew me .... [S]everal of them
who supported me came out in open opposition to Judge Carswell.
But then I have no right to complain that two rejected nominees
should be considered together and looked upon much as two peas in
the same pod.5
2. The nomination of Justice Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice had been withdrawn after the
Senate refused to close off debate, but the nomination was not rejected outright.
3. The case is International Org. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal &
Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 536 (1927). See also Fish, Red Jacket
Revisited: The Case That Unraveled John J. Parker's Supreme Court Appointment, 5 LAw & HIST.
REV. 51 (1987).
4. We earlier examined those parallels in detail. See Grossman & Wasby, Haynsworth and
Parker: History Does Live Again, 23 S. C.L. REv. 345 (1971). For a corrective to part of our argu-
ment about Judge Parker, see Fish, supra note 3, at 72-75.
5. Letter from Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. to Joel B. Grossman and Stephen L. Washy (Oct.
31, 1972).
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Judge Haynsworth's reaction to being grouped with Judge Parker
was quite different. In response to an examination of the parallels be-
tween the Parker and Haynsworth nominations, Judge Haynsworth
wrote movingly of his ties to Judge Parker: "[W]ith my great admiration
of him and my deep devotion to him, I am very pleased when anyone
speaks of the two of us in the same breath." He noted further: "I was
very close to him. Indeed, he literally died in my arms."' 6 As Judge
Haynsworth related the story:
No one seems to recall that I went on the Court of Appeals in early
April 1957 when Judge Parker was its very vigorous Chief Judge, and
that I served with him for almost a full twelve months before he died.
I had known him very pleasantly-as well as a young. lawyer with
rather frequent appearances in his court and a member of his circuit
judicial conference might be expected to know an older judge. He wel-
comed me warmly and, in the course of a few months, a deep devotion
developed between us. Indeed, he expressed great joy that he seemed
to be realizing in me all the hopes and ambitions he had entertained for
his son, who received fatal injuries in an automobile accident when a
very young man.
He had asked me to serve as the chairman of the program com-
mittee for the circuit judicial conference, and it came as no surprise to
me when he asked that I arrange to have that committee meet in
Washington at the time of the March meeting of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, so that he could introduce me to the mem-
bers of that group. I did that, and Mrs. Haynsworth and I, on the
evening of our arrival in Washington, met him for dinner. It was just
after dinner as we were walking through the lobby of the hotel that he
suffered his first attack.
Moreover his example inspired and sustained me as I picked up
my life after the vote in the Senate. He entertained no sense of bitter-
ness about denial of confirmation for him, and my first resolve was to
permit myself to entertain no such feeling. I have not done so ....
What success I have achieved in leading a fruitful and very happy
life since November 1969 I attribute in substantial part to Judge
Parker and the example he set for me.7
II.
From that tribute by Judge Haynsworth, we move to a somewhat
more difficult subject: the role of a judge's ethical standards and ideology
in the rejection of his nomination. This Article notes some scholarship
on the question whether that issue was determinative in the outcome of
the nomination and then uses Judge Haynsworth's words to correct a
6. Letter from Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. to Stephen L. Wasby (Nov. 29, 1972).
7. Id.
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part of the record. In so doing we offer his perspective on this important
aspect of the nomination process for federal judges.
Opposition to Judge Haynsworth's nomination was based on a com-
bination of disagreement with his perceived ideology as reflected in his
judicial rulings and concern about his ethical sensitivity. The former is-
sue centered on whether he had been sufficiently active in implementing
school desegregation, particularly at a time when the Supreme Court had
begun to demand more forward movement on the part of school districts
and lower court judges in formulating remedies. The ethics issue had
two elements. The first was that Judge Haynsworth was said not to have
recused himself from a case in which he appeared to have a financial
interest.8 The other involved his purchase of stock in a company that
had been a litigant in a case before him;9 the purchase was made after the
case was decided but before the decision was announced, and Judge
Haynsworth attributed his actions to inadvertence. The ethics topic was
likely to receive heightened attention at the time because, although the
attack on Justice Fortas' nomination as Chief Justice in 1968 primarily
resulted from his membership on the liberal Warren Court, his departure
from the Court in 1969 was tied directly to perceived ethical failures on
his part.10 And that departure had created the vacancy on the bench for
which Judge Haynsworth had been selected.
Whether ethics or ideology linked to political partisanship was the
principal reason for the rejection of Haynsworth's nomination has been a
matter of some debate. One position is that Senators, hesitant at that
time to oppose a nominee openly the basis of his ideology (although this
was not true during the recent Bork nomination), used the ethics issue as
a "cover" for their votes in opposition to Judge Haynsworth. Another
possibility, of course, is that the issue of ethics itself played a major part
in the rejection. Some years ago, we observed that if opposition to Judge
Haynsworth had remained at the level of partisan and ideological consid-
erations, where it had initially been rooted, then "the nomination would
almost certainly-have been approved."1 However we noted in our ear-
lier Article that "[w]hile most senators who voted against Judge Hayn-
sworth publicly attributed their opposition to the conflict of interest
issue, it is reasonable to speculate in the absence of evidence to the con-
8. Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963) (en banc), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
9. Brunswick Corp. v. Long, 392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968).
10. For the most recent study, see B. MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE (1988).
11. Grossman & Wasby, The Senate and Supreme Court Nominations Some Reflections, 1972
DUKE L.J. 557, 577.
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trary that the issue provided a convenient justification for opposition gen-
erated in fact by ideological or political considerations." 12
Studies of the rejection of Supreme Court nominations offer conflict-
ing evidence on this point. One study of roll call votes in the Hayn-
sworth and Carswell nominations suggested that the important
determinant of Senators' voting behavior was neither their political party
nor the geographic region from which they came, but rather their lib-
eral/conservative orientation. 13 Another study found that overall, the
distribution of Senators' votes was "consistent with the hypothesis that it
is primarily dissatisfaction with the predicted policy behavior of the nom-
inee which is the main motive force behind a vote against confirma-
tion." 14 However, with respect to the nominations of Fortas to be Chief
Justice (where the vote had been whether to close off debate), Carswell,
and Haynsworth, "only in Haynsworth's case did ethics seem to have an
important influence on the final vote (as opposed to merely the level of
rhetoric during debate in the Senate)"; evidence supporting this view in-
cludes the fact that some conservative Senators, "who might have been
expected to support Haynsworth on the basis of policy and ideology,"
voted against the nomination.1 5
An aspect of the ethics issue can be clarified by another piece of
previously unpublished correspondence from Judge Haynsworth. It in-
volves the Darlington Mills Case-important not only because of the eth-
ics issue but also because the Fourth Circuit's ruling was unfavorable to
labor. This result helps explain labor's presence in the coalition against
Judge Haynsworth, although some union lawyers did testify that he was
a fair and honest judge. In the Darlington Mills Case, the National La-
bor Relations Board found that Darlington Mills had been closed be-
cause of anti-union animus and ruled the Deering Milliken Company was
liable for Darlington's unfair labor practices and accordingly ordered
backpay for discharged Darlington workers and other remedies. Sitting
en banc, the Fourth Circuit voted three to two to set aside the order,
holding that the company had an absolute right to close part or all of its
business, regardless of anti-union motives.16 Since Haynsworth was in
the three-judge majority, his vote was crucial to the result. When the
case went to the Supreme Court, the Justices ruled in Textile Workers
12. Id.
13. M. Leavitt, Carswell and Haynsworth: An Elementary Study of Senate Voting (1970) (un-
published manuscript), cited in Grossman & Wasby, supra note 11, at 577 & n.85.
14. Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees,
13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 927, 935-36 (1979).
15. Id. at 939.
16. Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1963) (en banc), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. that an employer
could terminate an entire business for any reason, including anti-union
reasons, but could not close only part of a business for that reason.17
The Fourth Circuit ruling in the Darlington Mills Case stirred com-
plaints that Judge Haynsworth had behaved unethically. In an investiga-
tion conducted by Chief Judge Simon Sobeloff of the Fourth Circuit,
Judge Haynsworth was cleared of any charges of impropriety. In our
earlier examination of this matter, we stated that the investigation was
done "at the behest of Attorney General Robert Kennedy." 18 That state-
ment was wrong; Judge Haynsworth himself had requested the investiga-
tion. His own statement about the investigation corrected our mistake19
and the supporting documents are important footnotes to history.
Judge Haynsworth, responding to "implications... that the investi-
gation was done at the request of the Attorney General which cast the
matter in a different light from the reality,"20 explained:
General Kennedy never requested anything. What happened was that
Judge Sobeloff received a letter from Miss Eames, Counsel for the Tex-
tile Workers, in which she reported the receipt of an anonymous com-
munication which, if true, would indicate that I had consciously
accepted something in the nature of a bribe at the time of the first
Darlington Mills decision. Judge Sobeloff showed me the letter, and
the two of us, together, discussed what should be done. I told him, of
course, that the anonymous report was untrue. He had no doubt on
that score, but he and I were both concerned that there might be lin-
gering suspicion if he simply responded to Miss Eames with a state-
ment of a general denial on my part and of his belief in me. I cannot
now recall whether the suggestion of a complete investigation first
came from him or from me, but we came to the joint conclusion that,
for the sake of my reputation and the complete removal of all doubts
from the mind of Miss Eames, the appropriate thing to do was to have
Judge Sobeloff conduct a complete investigation and report his findings
to her.
The investigation, thus, was not at the request of the Attorney
General, but at my request and with my complete approval.
17. 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965).
18. Grossman & washy, supra note I1 at 577; Grossman & Washy, supra note 4, at 350.
19. It is indicative of Judge Haynsworth's moderation in connection with these events that
when we suggested that he might call our error to the attention of the editor of the Duke Law
Journal, his response was, "I do not think I should attempt to have the editor of the Duke Law
Journal print a letter from me about the Darlington Mills case. I made no effort to police the press
when it was carrying a large amount of misinformation about me. I do not want to run the risk of
appearing critical of that Journal or of you" for what he was gracious to call "such a relatively minor
slip." Letter from Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. to Joel B. Grossman (Nov. 22, 1972).
20. Letter from Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. to Joel B. Grossman and Stephen L. Wasby (Oct.
31, 1972).
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Copies of data and communications sent to Judge Sobeloff by the
lawyers and individuals he contacted were sent to Miss Eames. She
quickly realized that the anonymous report that she had received was
false. She wrote to Judge Sobeloff and told him so, and apologized for
having raised any question about the matter.
That would have closed the book, except that I was concerned
over the fact that a charge, however groundless, had been made and,
though now retracted, that some report of the investigation might get
abroad. With such things in mind, I requested Judge Sobeloff to send
his entire investigative file to General Robert Kennedy. Because of my
request, he did that, after which he received a response from General
Kennedy referring to the investigative file and expressing his complete
confidence in me.2 1
Judge Sobeloff, transmitting the file of correspondence between the
Textile Workers Union and Deering Milliken Corporation to the Attor-
ney General, pointed out that the person who had first raised the matter
with the court believed the claims were without foundation. The court's
investigation led to the same conclusion:
Happily, Miss Eames, who wrote the initial letter to the court on De-
cember 17, 1963, has herself acknowledged that the assertions and in-
sinuations about Judge Haynsworth, made to her by some anonymous
person in a telephone call, are without foundation; but I wish to add
on behalf of the members of the court that our independent investiga-
tion has convinced us that there is no warrant whatever for these asser-
tions and insinuations, and we express our complete confidence in
Judge Haynsworth.22
A few days later, Attorney General Kennedy responded, stating his
"complete confidence in Judge Haynsworth." He added, "Your thor-
ough and complete investigation reflects that the charges were without
foundation. I share your expression of complete confidence in Judge
Haynsworth. ' '23
As observers of the judicial process, there is little we can add to the
material presented here. Although the correspondence and other papers
of judges are used increasingly as the basis for studies of that process,
commentators seldom have the benefit of contemporaneous response to
their writing by the subjects of their studies. Fortunately, Judge Hayn-
sworth shared his views with us both to offer corrections and, far more
importantly, to provide a special perspective. That perspective reveals a
respected judge whose life was caught up in the flow of national political
history and who, despite considerable adversity, went on to give extended
service to the lawyers, judges, and people of his circuit.
21. Id.
22. Letter from Simon E. Sobeloff to Attorney General Robert Kennedy (undated) [Feb. 18,
1964].
23. Letter from Robert F. Kennedy to Simon E. Sobeloff (Feb. 28, 1964).
[Vol. 1990:74
